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Democracy and Security: The Current Debate on Reforming U.S.
Intelligence
The revelations of  Booz Allen Hamilton contractor Edward Snowden regarding the activit ies of  the National
Security Agency (NSA) at home and abroad have f ocused more attention on the issue of  ref orming intelligence
in the U.S. than at any time since the last major ref orms of  the 1970s.  Whereas in the 1970s the f ocus was
mainly on the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, this t ime it is the NSA, which,
due to a high level of  secrecy, was until recently commonly known as “No Such Agency”.  Snowden’s revelations
have received both praise, with appeals in the U.S. and abroad f or him to be granted amnesty, or even be
awarded the Nobel Peace prize, and condemnation with him being characterized as a traitor and spy.  In order
f or the reader to understand the general issue of  ref orm of  U.S. intelligence, I will f irst call attention to three
key characteristics of  the intelligence process in any democracy, and then analyze ref orm in terms of  the
institutions and processes that would be central to any ref orm.
Three Key Characteristics
A common ref rain of  intelligence prof essionals is “those who say don’t know, and those who know don’t say”. 
While this phrase may be self -serving, in the current issue there is much truth to it.  There is not really much of
a debate, but rather a great outpouring of  f acts and opinions in the mainline news media and innumerable
reports and interviews with members of  the American Civil Liberties Union, Federation of  American Scientists,
and other think tanks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) promoting transparency.  Meanwhile, the
Intelligence Community (IC), including the NSA, cannot def end itself  in public. [1]  This leads us to the second
characteristic of  intelligence in democracies: the constant tension between secrecy and transparency.  Any
democracy requires transparency; otherwise, how can the populace be expected to vote in an inf ormed manner
and the governors be accountable to the governed? However, all countries require some degree of  secrecy in
order to have security, and certainly this is the case in the U.S. today with so many state and non-state actors
declared enemies.  This is a paradox, and has no solution. There will always be tension between those who
demand transparency, and who currently dominate the public discussion in the U.S., and those who are
responsible f or security.  Third, and last, is the lopsided nature of  intelligence disclosures in public debates.
While there is ample literature and knowledge on intelligence f ailures, there is very litt le inf ormation on
intelligence successes. [2]  The IC cannot claim success, f or to do so would provide inf ormation on the
elements of  success to enemies. Any publicly available document that deals with success or f ailure cannot be
taken seriously. These three characteristics are present in the current debate generated by Snowden’s exposé.
Democracies have developed institutions and processes whereby they attempt to balance the contradictory
demands of  transparency and secrecy.  The contradiction between transparency and secrecy, as bef its a
paradox, never disappears; at best democracies achieve a balance that is broadly acceptable to the competing
demands f or transparency and security.  In our research, publications, and teaching we have sought to develop
a f ramework f or the analysis of  intelligence ref orm mainly, but not exclusively, in newer democracies.  The
f ramework grows out of  our analysis of  civil – military relations, and emphasizes the creation of  institutions
and the development of  civilian expertise. In our co-edited book, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to
Democratic Control and Effectiveness, we seek to compare established democracies, including the United
States, with new democracies including Brazil, Romania, and South Af rica.
Ref orm in intelligence is ref orm in terms of  the f ollowing f ive institutions and processes.  We look at control or
oversight as exercised by the executive, legislature, judiciary, internally to the IC itself , and externally including
media, think tanks, and NGOs.  I will consider the current situation regarding the NSA with ref erences to other
democracies in employing these categories. [3]  The legislature is crucial, by virtue of  its extensive powers in
the U.S. to any ref orm; it will receive the most attention in the f ollowing discussion, and will be analyzed last.
Executive Control
In all democracies, and f or that matter, non-democracies, the IC is under the control of  the executive.  In the
best of  circumstances the IC provides inf ormation – intelligence – to the executive who has the responsibility
f or the security of  the nation.  In our comparative study of  ten countries we f ound that executive control was
high in all but three (France, Russia, and Philippines).  In the U.S., leaders f ace a tremendous challenge in
exercising executive control of  a huge intelligence apparatus with seventeen separate agencies and a f iscal
year (FY) 2012 budget of  $78 billion, much of  which is classif ied, and theref ore not open to public debate. [4]
President Obama’s speech on January 17, 2014 regarding NSA ref orms, and his Policy Directive PPD-28, are
clear evidence of  him assuming this responsibility. [5] The latter is telling.  For example, in Section 6, “General
Provisions”, the President states:
“Nothing in this directive shall be construed to prevent me from exercising my constitutional
authority, including as Commander in Chief, Chief Executive, and in the conduct of foreign affairs,
as well as my statutory authority.”
While suggesting some ref orms, the main theme in President Obama’s speech was the importance of
intelligence in def ense of  the nation.  The editorial in the New York Times the next day is typical of  those who
want more explicit controls on the IC.  As the subtit le of  the editorial reads: “Restoring trust requires more than
a f ew good restrictions on collecting personal data”. [6]
Judicial Oversight
We f ound judicial oversight medium in the U.S. and two other countries (Brazil and South Af rica), and low in the
other seven. By medium we mean some relevance of  this oversight mechanism, and low means virtually no
relevance at all. This evaluation holds in the current debate regarding the NSA.  On the one hand Judge Richard
J. Leon of  the Federal District Court in Washington, D. C. ruled that the program was “almost Orwellian” and
probably unconstitutional. One week later Judge William H. Pauley III, of  the Federal District Court in New York,
reached an opposite conclusion, upholding the NSA’s program in part by noting that the f ounders of  the nation
approved of  secrecy.  In our book we have a chapter specif ically on the U.S. IC by a lawyer who was general
counsel f or both the CIA and NSA. [7]
There are two main reasons why we should expect lit t le f rom the judicial system in the U.S. regarding
intelligence ref orm. First, interpreting Article III (Judicial Powers) of  the U.S. Constitution narrowly, the courts
have not created investigative bodies or reviewed security policies outside of  a trial.  They have historically
def erred to the polit ical branches – executive and legislature – in issues involving national security.  Second, in
the U.S. the judicial system is based on trials, and trials must be open.  Neither the executive, nor the IC, want
to bring any issue involving secrecy to an open trial. On balance, it seems unlikely that the U.S. judicial system
will become much more involved in the issues raised by the NSA’s domestic activit ies.
Internal Controls
In our co-edited book, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, the thirteen
contributing authors f ound internal control over intelligence high in the U.S. and G.B. and either medium or low
in the other eight countries.  Internal controls ref er to institutions and processes whereby the IC controls
itself .  None of  the current major reports f ound any problems of  NSA personnel breaking any laws.  As stated
in the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted
under Section 215 of  the USA Patriot Act and on the Operations of  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of  January 23, 2014,
“However, none of these compliance issues involved significant intentional misuse of the system.
Nor has the Board seen any evidence of bad faith or misconduct on the part of any government
officials or agents involved with the program.” [8]
And, in the Report and Recommendations of  the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies, Liberty and Security in a Changing World of  December 12, 2013 they state
“Significantly, and in stark contrast to the pre-FISA era, the Review Group found no evidence of
illegality or other abuse of authority for the purpose of targeting domestic political activity.  This is of
central importance, because one of the greatest dangers of government surveillance is the potential
to use what is learned to undermine democratic governance.” [9]
Nor in President Obama’s speech did he suggest any wrongdoing on the part of  intelligence prof essionals.
Much to the contrary as he states:
“…the men and women of the intelligence community, including the NSA, consistently follow
protocols designed to protect the privacy of ordinary people. They are not abusing authorities in
order to listen to your private phone calls or read your emails.” [10]
The U.S. has in place a very robust system of  internal controls including inspectors general and general
counsels.  Then too, in contrast to many other countries, recruitment, education & training, and promotion are
generally based on prof essional vs. personal characteristics.  The main problem, however, is the very heavy
reliance on contractors who are not recruited nor supervised in a manner similar to U.S. Government
employees.  This has been the topic of  sensationalist reporting and some serious scholarship. [11]  It should
be noted that Edward Snowden was a contractor, and had been vetted by the private contracting f irm, USIS
that has been sued by the government f or pushing through clearances without suf f icient investigation. [12]
External Oversight
Legislative Control and Oversight
In our comparative study, legislative control and oversight was high only in the U.S. and low to medium in the
other nine countries.  Comparatively, the U.S. Congress is extremely powerf ul due to its ability to pass laws,
determine the budget, and conduct oversight.   The last major ref orm of  intelligence in the U.S., which took
place in the 1970s, was a result of  two investigating committees:  The Pike Committee in the House of
Representatives and the Church Committee in the Senate.  The investigations resulted in legislation limiting the
secrecy and power of  the executive in all matters concerning intelligence.
Probably the most important result was the creation of  two select committees, which are almost “standing
committees” since they can report out legislation. These are the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).  These two select  committees
have f ull access to all possible tools of  the U.S. Congress, including law-making, budget authority, and
oversight. [15] It is no surprise, then, that President Obama, in his speech of  January 17, 2014 stated he would
consult with the relevant committees in Congress.  By the the f all of  2013 the Congress already had bef ore it a
minimum of  twenty-two (22) laws regarding the NSA and by January 2014 they were considering major changes
to FISA. [16]
While the U.S. Congress has, relative to all other countries we are f amiliar with, extensive powers of  control
and oversight of  intelligence, including its ref orm, there are not surprisingly some limits on its ability to f ully
exercise these powers.  As one of  the most knowledgeable experts on the U.S. Congress told me: “Laws are
not self -enf orcing.” [17]  Experts have noted that these limitations include the f ollowing: a lack of  expertise in
the myriad of  topics the IC deals with; limited polit ical incentives; unclear or shared jurisdiction with the
executive; and cooptation by the IC.[18] Theref ore, while the powers of  the U.S. Congress are extremely
robust, one should not look to the Congress to resolve all of  the issues brought up by the exposé of  Mr.
Snowden.
Conclusion
Compared to other countries, and particularly to new democracies, control and oversight over the IC in the U.S.
is elaborate and robust.  It is, however, always “a work in progress” in that there is an inherent contradiction
between the needs f or transparency and f or secrecy.  There will always be a constant tug-of -war between
these two ends.  The current situation arising f rom the exposé of  Mr. Snowden has highlighted this
contradiction.  If , on the one hand, the IC can point to the publication of  Statement for the Record to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community of  James R.
Clapper, Director of  National Intelligence of  January 29, 2014, as important proof  of  transparency, crit ics can
point to secret NSA metadata programs under Section 215 of  the USA PATRIOT Act which, in their view at
least, violate Americans’ right to privacy.
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